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In the United Kingdom most medical students are first introduced to epidemiology as a formal discipline during their clinical years-usually during a course in social or community medicine. The amount of time allocated to the subject varies greatly between schools, but everywhere epidemiology is a recent addition to an already overcrowded curriculum and, like all parvenus, has a need to justify its position in terms that everyone can understand. Such justification must of course be to clinicians who have often had to yield time and who are rightly suspicious of any new arrival; but, perhaps more importantly, it must also be to students who reasonably demand that any new burden must be not only intellectually satisfying but of obvious relevance to their immediate clinical interests. Moreover, having tasted at last the delights of clinical doing, students have a natural distaste for anything that seems to demand even a partial return to some form of systematised classroom learning.
The placing of epidemiology in the clinical years has, of course, great advantages for the teacher. He can build an understanding of the uses of epidemiology, as well as its methods, on the particular clinical interests and insights of individual students, so that they can feel it is they who have provided the starting points for teaching. This helps to bring a potentially dull subject alive and to allow epidemiology quite quickly to assume its essential role as a unifier of clinical, social, and preventive concepts of health and disease, instead of appearing as the mere servant of one.
There are, however, ways in which the teacher of epidemiology stands greatly disadvantaged next to his clinical colleagues. The clinician's justification'of his activities, the immediacy of his time scales, the spiritual rewards of his action, need no conscious transmission to the student; they enhance (when they do not obscure) the scientific as well as the humanitarian basis of his thinking. But the epidemiologist has no such allies for his science-his activities seem remote, his time scales long, his rewards intellectual, and every step he takes, every conclusion he reaches, must be exposed to the cold logic and debate that he rightly insists are the very essence of his subject. Yet it is just this dependence on scientific reasoning that exposes epidemiology's weakest flank. For however deeply The second component of the doubt is, however, more fundamental and extends beyond the teaching of the subject into the organisation of its concepts. It is simply this: the able student is too often asked to accept as a science a discipline justified only by its techniques. The teaching of epidemiology, certainly as illustrated in many of the good textbooks available to students, tends to depend too much on detailed description of methods and the uses to which they may be put without concentrating equally on the theoretical concepts that relate those methods and which alone can justify any claim epidemiology may have to be called a basic science (whatever that may be). Nor is there a chance that a mere collection of methods, however precise, can ever predict the pattern of its own future development, which is surely a legitimate demand on any science. If epidemiology were content to remain the mere interpreter of recorded observations then perhaps the elaboration and perfection of techniques would be enough, but it has higher aspirations than that and if they are to be realised it will only be by developing more fully the theoretical concepts that unite its methods. Only then can the bright student be expected to accept the subject as intellectually satisfying and to see its relevance to the many aspects of clinical and laboratory medicine which have a just and increasing claim on its interest.
To be useful, a unifying concept must start by being simple, and then be capable of increasingly complex and exciting development in any of the several 201 202 directions in which the science it explains is elaborated. These directions, in epidemiology, are as much dictated by new knowledge and understanding outside its formal territory as by new ideas and techniques within it. For it is surely as a mediator between the too tightly defined interests of specialty medicine and research that the modern science of epidemiology will find at least part of its future fulfilment and to which the elaboration of its concepts must pay due heed.
There are several basic ideas in epidemiology that offer themselves as concepts capable of development to the point where they become unifying principles. To me, the simple idea of a 'rate'-of a numerator related to a denominator within a defined period of time-seems the most attractive. It is certainly open to far greater conceptual elaboration than most textbooks, and indeed teachers, allow. It seems at present to be used as a starting point and then dropped when it has been sufficiently described in its simplest current usage; too little consideration is given to its potential development as an idea, not only in its separate parts but in the increasingly complex relationships which unite them. Such development can take us to the very boundaries of our clinical, pathological, behavioural, and social understanding, and so promise just those insights necessary for the intellectual delight of both teacher and student.
Consider how teacher and student can manipulate the idea of a 'rate'. If, perhaps, they incline to historical beginnings they can take the numerator-those diseased-and, separately, the denominator population from which they come, and trace how much the historical development of routine data-gathering has depended on contemporaneous understandings of biological and population sciences and, because of this and the inertias common to systems, how the gathering of data has sometimes forced us, and still does, to live with models of disease from which contemporary knowledge of biology, genetics, and behaviour would have had us free.
Still using the rate in a purely descriptive sense and still concentrating on its separate parts, they can then begin to see how poorly the 'binomial' definition suited to the numerators of the days of infectious disease suits the diseases of today. For an ageing population faced with diseases of personal and social behaviour, or genetically determined at birth, definitions must more often be sought in the tail of a Gaussian distribution, or in a concept of attributable risk, than in the yes/no judgments of the clinical laboratory. Such a need for new definitions may lift the student beyond the intellectual confines of his hospital experience towards a broader understanding of those aspects of social and behavioural sciences which have a direct bearing on disease, and send him T. R. Cullinan searching among the denominator populations for the characteristics he needs to build his new models. He need not be worried that his search will be confined to well-trodden demographic and social paths alone. Modern clinical and behavioural science provides such a kaleidoscope of ideas about the characteristics of populations that have a bearing on their diseases that his way will lead through just those details of genetics, immunology, pathology and psychology that he is used to thinking of in relation to his individual patients. In applying such thoughts to populations rather than individuals he will inevitably develop understandings which are not always compatible with what he has been taught at the bedside, but he will clearly be in a position to criticise some epidemiological studies for their lack of sensitivity to the things he knows are relevant to his patients. Why should he believe that a family history of disease is important to his patient if epidemiologists so often discount it?
The bearing that these multifaceted and interrelated features of a population have on disease is twofold, in aetiology and definition, though we have long been used to over-stressing the first at the expense of the second. But Perhaps one of the strengths of the 'rate' is that it is so simple an idea that it can be dropped when it has strayed beyond its natural logic into the realms of the fanciful or taken up again when some process of thought has led teacher and student beyond rational understanding.
